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I. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Court Erred When It Excluded Paragraph 3 of Henry Madsen's 
Affidavit dated August 2, 2012 
Kevic is right when it states that "[p ]hotographs are generally admissible when the 
witness identifies the photograph and testifies that the photograph correctly portrays the scene or 
object." (Respondents/Cross Appellant's Response and Opening Brief, Page 7; citing McKee v. 
Chase, 73 Idaho 491, 253 P.2d 787) In the deposition of Kevic's owner and manager, Kevin 
Lett, Mr. Lett did just that. He testified that even though he did not know when the photographs 
were taken, that the photographs in question are those of his car wash's exit and that the 
photographs depict that when cars came out of the car wash they leave water on the ground of 
the exit. (Augmented Record, Affidavit of Henry Madsen filed on November 1, 2012, Exhibit 
Page 14 through 17) The exit of the car was is the scene ofIrina Shea's slip and fall. 
"Photographs and pictures relevant to describe a person, place or thing are admissible for 
the purpose of explaining and applying the evidence ... " Zolber v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712 
P.2d 525 (1985). Relevance has two main aspects, (1) materiality, which "requires that the issue 
for which the specific evidence is offered to prove be a material issue in the case" and (2) 
probative value, which makes evidence relevant if it logically tends to prove or disprove" the 
material issue. Id. at 827, 528. The photographs submitted in Paragraph 3 of the Affidavit of 
Henry Madsen do both things. 
1. Relevance 
The exit of the car wash as well as the location of the car wash with regard to 3rd Street 
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and the adjacent building where Kevin Lett operated his mechanic service and where he was 
working as a mechanic the morning of the Irina's fall are all material issues for which the 
photographs were relevant in this case. The photographs showed a location and description of 
the set of buildings where the event took place. It is where Ms. Shea alleges there was a 
combination of water and ice, even though the sides of the car wash were dry. It is where Mr. 
Lett admits was cold and icy in his deposition testimony. It is where customers of Lett's Car 
Wash were required to exit their vehicle and turn their mirrors into drivable, legal condition after 
employees of Lett's Car Wash pushed them into an inoperable position at the beginning of the 
car wash. It is where an ongoing and continuously hazardous condition existed that was 
reasonably foreseen and known to Mr. Letts and his employees as Mr. Lett was working just feet 
away in the adjacent building and should have known of the dangerous circumstances. It is 
where Ms. Shea fell and broke her wrist. While some of these descriptions can only be shown 
through circumstantial evidence, that evidence is enough for a trier of fact to make a 
determination on rather than at summary judgment. 
Even the stock civil jury instructions make this clear to the jury. For instance, Idaho Jury 
Instruction 1.24.1, Circumstantial evidence without definition, provides good instruction on how 
to view circumstantial evidence: 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable 
method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
The law in Idaho is very clear that circumstantial evidence can be used to create a 
genuine issue of material fact. See, KolIn v. Saint Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 336, 
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940 P.2d 1142, 1155 (1997). The District Court here erred when it disallowed the photographs 
to be used as evidence because those photographs, although containing circumstantial evidence, 
combined with other evidence created a genuine issue as to whether or not Kevin Lett knew of 
the dangerous condition. 
2. Probative Value 
The scene of the car wash's exit was obviously difficult to describe for Ms. Shea. Her 
first language is Russian, and the language barrier is obvious when reading the deposition 
testimony. The pictures of the car wash exit show more than any deposition testimony ever 
could. It shows how the vehicles track water down the concrete exit of the car wash, forming 
puddles of water yet leaving the sides of the car wash (as stated by Ms. Shea) "amazingly dry." 
This is an inherent nature of a car wash-spraying vehicles with water and then pushing still wet 
vehicles out of the wash and into an exit to dry. Naturally, water will traverse out the exit of the 
car wash, and in this case, down a steep concrete exit towards a busy city thoroughfare. 
B. The District Court Erred When it Granted Summary Judgment to Kevic 
On page nine (9) of its response brief, Kevic Corporation admits that Ms. Shea was an 
invitee to the car wash. It then goes into deposition transcript of Ms. Shea, somehow making an 
argument that Ms. Shea admitted there was no ice on the ground when she slipped and fell at the 
exit of the car wash. However, Kevic's argument (which has remained consistent from the trial 
court to here) is inherently flawed. It continues to misconstrue Ms. Shea's testimony. She 
clearly stated that the ground on the sides of the her car when she stepped out to fix her mirrors 
was "amazingly dry." This testimony comports with the evidence in the case; namely, the 
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photographs that show the ground on the sides of the exit being dry and the water pooling in the 
center of the exit. She then testifies, as shown on page eleven (11) of Kevic' s brief and citing to 
the Deposition of Ms. Shea, p. 65, L. 21- p. 66, L. 6 (CR 46-47), that the ground was dry 
everywhere else except at the spot she fell-"it was dry everywhere else, but that spot." Recall 
that Ms. Shea fell at the front of her car. Her deposition testimony clearly relays this. It also 
clearly relays that the front of her car was wet and icy. Kevic continues to point out that she said 
it was amazingly dry, but continuously fails to magnify the most important part of her testimony; 
that is, the ground although dry everywhere else was wet and icy on the most important area-
the area that she slipped, fell and snapped her wrist-which was the front of the car. 
C. Kevic's Knowledge Of The Hazardous Condition 
Even though Kevic had apparent knowledge of the hazardous condition as set forth in 
Ms. Shea's Opening Brief, Ms. Shea is not required to show knowledge of the condition based 
on the fact that the condition was continuous, on-going and easily foreseeable by Kevic. 
McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 707 P.2d 416, (1985); All v. Smith's Mgmt. 
~, 109 Idaho 479,482, 708 P.2d 884, 887 (1985). 
Reliance on Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602 (Id.Ct.App. 
2011) is flawed because Antim's holding applies only to a situation that is not ongoing, as does 
the remaining case law that Kevic used in support of his summary judgment motion. A car wash 
that creates a continuous pool of water in the center of the exit of a car wash is an ongoing 
condition. The basic operation of the car wash creates the hazardous condition by pushing water 
out of the covered car wash and onto a concrete exit in freezing weather. It is Kevic' s 
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responsibility to monitor the condition, warn its customers, and apply methods to rectify the 
condition. Just because the car wash exit only had ice in the center of the exit, rather than all 
over the entire exit, does not dissipate Kevic's responsibility. If anything, it creates a greater 
responsibility upon Kevic, because its customer will get out of their cars and see ground that is 
amazingly dry near the vehicle doors, only to round the front of their car to fix their mirrors and 
without notice, enter into a hazardous condition of pooled water and ice. 
Finally, in support of Shea's position, she would argue that black ice cannot be seen. 
Although the front of her car appeared wet, the sides of her car appeared dry. Kevic knew his 
car was pushed water onto the center of the car wash's exit. When the temperatures reached 
freezing on the day Shea fell, that freezing temperature contributed to the ice freezing and being 
nearly invisible to Shea. It appeared to be water and it is what caused her to fall. 
The following dictionaries describe "black ice." Webster's New World College 
Dictionary (4th ed.), p. 151, describes black ice as "a thin, nearly invisible layer of ice on a 
paved road." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11 th ed.), p. 129, defines black ice as "a 
nearly transparent film of ice on a dark surface (as a paved road or a body of water) that is 
difficult to see." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.), p. 191, 
defines black ice as "[a] thin, nearly invisible coating of ice that forms on paved surfaces." The 
New Oxford American Dictionary (2nd ed.), p. 172, describes it as "a transparent coating of ice, 
found esp. on a road or other paved surface." The American Century Dictionary (2005), p. 60, 
defines it as a "thin layer of invisible ice on a road, etc." 
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Kevic knew his car wash pushed water onto the surface of a part of the car wash exit. He 
required Shea to exit her vehicle in order to readjust her outdoor mirrors and place a tip in the tip 
box for his employees. He failed to warn her black ice may be present, and he failed to 
remediate the situation which his car wash continually creates. 
D. Duty Owed to Shea 
Finally, Kevic owed a duty to Shea to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing her to an 
unreasonable risk of harm. At any trial, this would be a factual question posed properly to a jury. 
Idaho Jury Instruction Section 3.03 has a stock jury instruction which would explicitly provide 
this instruction to a jury. Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 762, 215 P.3d 476, 482 (2009). 
Kevic failed to exercise ordinary care when he instructed his employees to adjust Shea's 
mirrors in violation of Idaho traffic laws, effectively rendering her vehicle into an unsafe driving 
condition. Then, when the car wash was over and she was required to get out of the vehicle to 
correct the mirror adjustment, Kevic still owed her a duty to keep the water from pooling in the 
center of the car wash exit. Especially on winter occasions (which Kevic testified that he had 
owned and operated the car wash for 12 winters) when the water turned into ice, Kevic owed a 
duty to his invitees to ensure they did not traverse on the wet and potentially icy pavement. His 
adjustment of Shea's mirrors, and negligent care of the pavement of the car wash's exit, was the 
proximate cause of Shea's slip and fall. 
- 10 -
II. 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
A. Kevic's Motion to Exclude Portions of Ms. Shea's Affidavit was Properly 
Denied By the District Court 
Kevic requested the District Court strike portions of an affidavit of Ms. Shea which she 
filed in support of her Motion for Reconsideration. Kevic's basis for the objection to her 
affidavit was based on its opinion that her affidavit contradicted her deposition testimony. Now, 
Kevic asserts that the Affidavit of Irina Shea was untimely. The timeliness issue was not raised 
in Kevic's first Notice of Appeal, nor was it submitted to the District Court during oral argument 
on October 2, 2012. 
"On appeal, neither [the Idaho Supreme] Court, nor the Court of Appeals, can consider 
issues which were not raised before the trial court." Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 49, 867 
P.2d 920, 923 (1993)(citing Old Nat'l Bank of Washington v. Tate, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834 P.2d 
1317, 1318 (1992); Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). While it is undisputed that Kevic objected to the testimony of Shea 
contained in her Affidavit, he only raised an objection based on the affidavit conflicting with her 
deposition testimony. He never raised an issue as to timeliness at the trial court during Shea's 
motion for reconsideration. 
Kevic acknowledges that evidentiary issues are subject to the abuse of discretion 
standard. He further acknowledges that Shea's affidavit was filed in support of her Motion for 
Reconsideration. Such affidavits are allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, 
the District Court should consider new facts or information presented by Shea which "bear on 
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the correctness of the District Court's interlocutory order." Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 
154 Idaho 549, 300 P.3d 1037, 1045 (2012)(citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank 
of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990». Kevic's arguments against 
allowing an affidavit in a motion for reconsideration fails because it withholds years of Idaho 
case law which allows affidavits to be submitted to the trial court to address concerns, or which 
bear on the correctness, of the trial court's order, in addition to Rule 11(a)(2), which allows 
affidavits to be submitted in support of reconsideration motions. 
Additionally, when filing Shea's affidavit, it was not an attempt to cover old ground that 
had not been considered at the motion for summary judgment. Shea has asserted throughout this 
litigation that her testimony is, while perhaps muddled on some issues, fairly clear and consistent 
that while the sides of her vehicle were "amazingly dry," the front of her vehicle (where she fell) 
was wet and icy. Her affidavit corrects the interpretation error the Court applied to her 
deposition testimony, and is an available mechanism under the evidence for a motion for 
reconsideration. Kevic asserts this clarification falls under the Sham Affidavit Doctrine. He 
continually misconstrues Shea's deposition testimony to make it appear as though there was no 
water anywhere near her. This fails a basic logical test. A car wash creates an environment that 
is naturally wet. When the vehicles leave the covered car wash, they will track water onto the 
exit. There is literally no way to avoid this occurrence at Kevic's car wash. The photographs 
submitted to the District Court showed this. If photographs were taken today, they would show 
the exact same occurrence. Kevic's owner, Kevin Lett, even admitted that it was cold and icy at 
the exit of the car wash as discussed in Shea's Opening Brief. 
- 12 -
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Kevic asserts that Shea is simply asking this Court to "second guess the District Court on 
conflicting evidence" and that is the reason he should be awarded attorney fees. However, that is 
not what is happening. In Shea's opening brief she articulated various reasons, citing persuasive 
authority, as to why the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. 
Kevic filed a cross-appeal on an issue which did not affect the outcome of his case. The 
only reason he filed the cross-appeal was because Shea filed an appeal-he is merely attempting 
to create undue delay and needlessly increase the costs of this appeal. Further, Kevic has not 
shown an abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial court as it relates to allowing the Affidavit of 
Irina Shea into evidence. He has provided this Court with a completely different argument than 
what was used when he first argued striking Shea's affidavit at the trial court. His argument 
against Shea for attorney fees can be used against him as well, as he is simply second guessing 
the trial court's ruling without providing any legitimate basis for this court to reverse it. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of August, 2013. 
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant/ 
Cross Responden /' 
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